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INTRODUCTION 
Crowdfunding is defined as the process of asking a large number of 
separate third parties for relatively small amounts of money to fund an 
endeavor.
1
  Although the concept of asking for financial “contributions” 
is not new, seeking funds from others via websites on the Internet is 
relatively new.
2
  It has been reported that the term crowdfunding was not 
used until 2006, and two of the most popular crowdfunding sites, 
Kickstarter and Indiegogo, were not founded until 2009 and 2008, 
respectively.
3
  Information is not available regarding the annual number 
of crowdfunding endeavors, the number of funding participants, or the 
total amount of money obtained in successful crowdfunding campaigns, 
but accurate information is available that shows crowdfunding is 
encompassing an impressive number of participants and amounts of 
money.
4
  Professor C. Steven Bradford stated in 2012 that “in the 
aggregate, crowdfunding is huge,”
5
 and since his statement in 2012, 
crowdfunding has grown dramatically.  For example, Kickstarter reports 
that between 2009 and August 2015 over 9 million backers pledged 
approximately $1.9 billion to more than 90,000 projects, representing 
over 24 million total pledges.
6
  More than $500 million of the pledged 
amounts were reported to have occurred between March 2013 and March 
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 1.  DAREN C. BRABHAM, CROWDSOURCING 37 (2013); C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and 
the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012); see Edan Burkett, A 
Crowdfunding Exemption? Online Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Security Regulation, 13 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 66 (2011) (noting that definitions of crowdfunding vary and 
describing a definition). 
 2.  Bradford, supra note 1, at 11. 
 3.  Burkett, supra note 1, at 70, 71 n.51. 
 4.  See Bradford, supra note 1, at 11. 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  
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7
  Indiegogo also reported that it had a 1000% increase in amounts 




As with any distinctly new financing vehicle, there are many legal 
issues raised by crowdfunding that have not been explored or answered.  
One such issue is the income tax consequences associated with 
crowdfunding.
9
  Although the academy has not yet widely addressed the 
issues
10
 and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has yet to provide any 
formal guidance,
11
 it has been pointed out in the popular press that there 
is a lack of clarity that needs to be addressed.
12
  As one journalist 
succinctly states: “Taxing crowdfunding pledges is one of a host of 
policy considerations that government agencies must address in coming 
months as the technique becomes increasing[ly] popular and potentially 
hides questionable business dealings by both companies and investors.”
13
  
It has also been noted that the most popular crowdfunding sites are 
                                                          
 7.  OMG, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/1billion (last visited Aug. 19, 2015). 
 8.  Katherine Noyes, Why Investors Are Pouring Millions Into Crowdfunding, FORTUNE (Apr. 
17, 2014, 6:47 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/04/17/why-investors-are-pouring-millions-into-
crowdfunding/. 
 9.  This Article addresses only the income-tax issues associated with crowdfunding. 
 10.  E.g., Eric Dietz, The Tax Code’s Crowdfunding Dilemma: The Temptation of Kickstarter 
Creators to Use the Gift Exclusion Under Section 102(a), 37 HAMLINE L. REV. 293, 309 (2014) 
(arguing that Kickstarter should be responsible for advising crowdfunders that they should not 
exclude crowdfunding receipts from taxable income as a gift under Code section 102). 
 11.  The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) issued technical interpretations regarding the taxation 
of crowdfunding. Treatment of Funds Obtained Through “Crowdfunding” Received by a Taxpayer, 
Can. Revenue Agency Doc. No. 2013-0484941E5 (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://www.canadiantaxlitigation.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/2013-0484941E5.txt; What Is 
the Tax Treatment of Amounts Received Through Crowdfunding?, Can. Revenue Agency Doc. No. 
2013-0508971E5 (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.canadiantaxlitigation.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/2013-0508971E5.txt (“[T]he CRA would not be able to make any 
determination on the income tax consequences of a particular crowdfunding arrangement without a 
full review of all the facts, circumstances and documentation, if any, relating to [the crowdfunding] 
arrangement.”), What Is the Tax Treatment of Amounts Received Through Crowdfunding?, Can. 
Revenue Agency Doc. No. 2013-0509101E5 (Oct. 29, 2013), 
http://www.canadiantaxlitigation.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/2013-0509101E5.txt 
(“[V]oluntary payments (or other transfers of benefits) received by virtue of a profession or by virtue 
of carrying on a business are considered to be taxable receipts.”).   
 12.  Nat Rudarakanchana, Crowdfunding: Income or Gift? IRS Taxes and SEC Regulations 
Could Hurt Startups and Innovation on Kickstarter and Indiegogo, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 19, 
2013, 9:14 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/crowdfunding-income-or-gift-irs-taxes-sec-regulations-
could-hurt-startups-innovation-kickstarter (“Say you’re raising money on Kickstarter for an 
independent film project: Are the proceeds a sort of communal gift-giving or simply a clever source 
of standard taxable income?  The distinction matters, but nobody seems to know for sure.  The U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service may have an opinion on the matter, but if the agency does, it’s not saying, 
leaving developers on crowdsourcing platforms such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo in the dark.  One 
consequence of the lack of clarity: A likely tax court challenge . . . .”). 
 13.  Id.  
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attracting individuals from the creative fields of film, music, television 
and other arts—fields traditionally not populated by individuals 
accustomed to addressing business and tax issues.
14
 
Part I of this Article will provide an overview of the most popular 
types of crowdfunding models and an example of an actual 
crowdfunding campaign in order to highlight the tax issues.  Part II 
addresses the tax aspects of crowdfunding models that provide loans 
(model 4) and equity investments (model 5).  Part III will present the tax 
consequences when a tax-exempt entity is used to crowdfund using 
model 1 (donations) and models 2 and 3 (reward and pre-purchase). Part 
IV and Part V will provide a review of current income tax and gift tax 
laws as they are applied to crowdfunding model 1 (donations) and 
models 2 and 3 (reward and pre-purchase) and will show that the current 
tax laws do not provide a bright-line answer to whether or not a 
crowdfunding transaction in the latter models is excludable from income.  
However, there are guidelines that emerge from current tax law that 
require administrative action by the IRS to clarify income and gift tax 
uncertainties regarding crowdfunding.  In Part VI it is recommended that 
the IRS should issue guidance stating that funds received in a 
crowdfunding campaign are gross income under Internal Revenue Code 
section 61.
15
  It is also recommended that the IRS should provide a safe-
harbor test, as described in Part VI, so as to determine if funds received 
in crowdfunding model 1 (donations) and models 2 and 3 (reward and 
pre-purchase) are gifts that are not subject to federal income tax, which 




                                                          
 14.  See Suw Charman-Anderson, Kickstarter’s Sting in the Tail: Tax, FORBES (May 23, 2012, 
12:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/suwcharmananderson/2012/05/23/kickstarters-sting-in-the-
tail-tax/ (“One particularly important issue, which has gone largely undiscussed in the crowdfunding 
community, is tax.  In my long-past life as an underemployed music journalist, I met a lot of 
musicians who were focused exclusively on the creative aspects of their lives.  They didn’t want to 
understand how record labels structured their contracts or what the legalese meant.  They didn’t want 
to think about what the words or the numbers really meant; if they could have ignored it completely, 
they would have.  Now, some 15 years later, Kickstarter is a honey pot for creative people, attracting 
them with the lure of all that sweet golden money that will allow them to make the art they’ve 
always wanted to.  And attitudes to the business side of things will, I suspect, not have changed.”).  
Another example of when lack of clarity can affect compliance is seen in the taxation of automobile 
expenses. See James Alm & Jay A. Soled, The Internal Revenue Code and Automobiles: A Case 
Study of Taxpayer Noncompliance, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 419, 442 (2013) (“Aside from . . . deliberate 
violations, the lack of clear rules is another contributory factor in taxpayer noncompliance.”). 
 15.  All references to the Internal Revenue Code are hereinafter the “Code.”   
 16.  See infra Part VI. 
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I. CROWDFUNDING MODELS 
Five crowdfunding models may be identified and classified on the 
basis of the type of return provided in exchange for the funds provided.
17
  
The five models are: “(1) the donation model; (2) the reward model; (3) 
the pre-purchase model; (4) the lending model; and (5) the equity 
model.”
18
  A contributor in the donation model does not receive anything 
tangible in return for the contribution.
19
  In the reward model, the 
contributor usually receives something of marketable value in return; 
whereas in the pre-purchase model, the contributor is promised a copy of 
the item that the organizer of the crowdfunding campaign plans to create: 
for example, if the campaign is successful, the contributor may receive a 
copy of a film created.
20
  The lending model employed by sites such as 
Kiva involves loans, usually interest free and in very small amounts.
21
  
Before the passage of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in 
2012, securities laws had prohibited the equity model in the United 
States.
22
  Compliance with the new laws allows contributors an equity 




A. Crowdfunding Example 
A recently successful reward-type of crowdfunding campaign 
undertaken in order to produce a documentary film will serve as a good 
example, illustrating the potential income tax issues that arise when 
                                                          
 17.  Bradford, supra note 1, at 14. 
 18.  Id. at 14–15. 
 19.  Id. at 15. 
 20.  Id. at 16. 
 21.  See id. at 20–21, 29; see also Sarah B. Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions 
for Microfinance Lenders, 61 SMU L. REV. 1525, 1534 (2008).   
 22.  See Burkett, supra note 1, at 75 (“Securities laws, however, are a formidable barrier to 
investment crowdfunding in the United States . . . .”).  The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
(JOBS Act) includes an exemption from registration for crowdfunded offers and sales of securities.  
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012); Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, 126 Stat. 
306, 315–23 (2012).  This crowdfunding model is not yet law so these models may not provide 
ownership or rewards in exchange for equity investments.  John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social 
Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the 
Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 585 (2013).  The Securities and Exchange Commission is 
scheduled to release final rules to implement the new law by October 2015. Office of Mgmt. and 
Budget, View Rule, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201410&RIN=3235-AL37 (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2015). 
 23.  See Joan MacLeod Heminway, What is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 335, 357, 359 (2012) (explaining crowdfunding’s investment model). 
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goods and services (perks or rewards) are provided in exchange for 
money.  The filmmakers of a documentary film entitled Be Natural: The 
Untold Story of Alice Guy-Blaché (hereinafter referred to as the Guy-
Blaché film) obtained approximately $200,000 from crowdfunding to 
complete the project.
24
  The following table is a selective sample of the 
“rewards” promised for each level of money provided to the project; it 
also shows the number of contributors and the total amount provided at 
each monetary level.  The information provided in the table is for 
illustrative purposes only and represents only fourteen of the forty-six 
monetary levels established for the campaign,
25
 only a portion of the total 
amount collected, and only a portion of the total number of 
contributors.
26
  The total number of individuals who contributed to the 
project was 3,840.
27
  2,992 backers provided $100 or less and 
represented $99,348 of the total contributed; whereas 135 backers 











$1 303 $303 A general “thank you” 
$10   343 $3,430 A “thank you” sent by 
email or twitter from 
the producers  
$15   242 $3,630 A “thank you” mailed 
by postcard 
                                                          
 24.  Pamela Green & Jarik van Sluijs, Be Natural: The Untold Story of Alice Guy-Blaché, 
KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/benatural/be-natural-the-untold-story-of-alice-
guy-blache/description (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).  Alice Guy-Blaché (1873–1968): 
wrote, directed, or produced more than 1,000 films.  At age 23, she was one of the first 
filmmakers to make a narrative movie.  She pioneered the technology of syncing sound to 
film.  She created the first film with an all African-American cast.  And she was the first 
woman to build and run a film studio.  Any idea who she is?  If not, you’re far from 
alone.  A majority of people—even Hollywood directors, actors, and producers—have 
never heard of her. 
Adrienne Vogt, The First Woman Behind a Camera, Now Forgotten, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 21, 
2013, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articles/2013/08/20/alice-guy-blach-
hollywood-s-female-pioneer.html. 
 25.  Green & van Sluijs, supra note 24.  Each monetary level includes all of the rewards offered 
on all levels above the amount contributed.  Id.  
 26.  See id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
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$19 173 $3,287 Receive a digital 
download of all the 
project Kickstarter 
videos - the pitch, the 
trailer, the updates, plus 
a special behind the 
scenes video 
$25   150 $3,750 A“thank you” tweet or 
email, and a “Be 
Natural” project 
bumper sticker 
$29   93 $2,697 A copy of one of Alice 
Guy-Blaché’s scripts 
and marketing 
materials promoting the 
release of the film 
$35   605 $21,175 Digital download of the 
film 
$99   10 $990 A DVD copy of Alice 
Guy-Blaché’s film “A 
Fool and His Money” 
(1912) 
$250   18 $4,500 DVD of the final film, 
a “Be Natural” project 
pin, baseball hat, water 
bottle, pen, notebook, 
and t-shirt, plus a 
“thank you” by email 
or tweet 
$500   15 $7,500 Contributor’s name on 
the thank-you list on 
the project’s website, 
DVD of the final film, 
a “Be Natural” project 
postcard, bumper 
sticker, pin, tote bag, 
pen, baseball cap, 
coffee/tea mug, water 
bottle, notebook, and t-
shirt 
$1,000   7 $7,000 DVD of the final film, 
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a “Be Natural” project 
postcard, bumper 
sticker, pin, dog or cat 
collar, tote bag, pen, 
baseball cap, iPhone 
case, coffee/tea mug, 
water bottle, notebook, 
beret, charm bracelet, 
scarf, tie, bow tie, and 
t-shirt 
$1,500   4 $6,000 Two tickets to the 
family and friends 
screening in LA or 
NYC and to the after 
party (travel and 
accommodations not 
included).  
Contributor’s name on 
the thank-you list on 
the project’s website, 
DVD of the final film, 
and any three of the 
following: a “Be 
Natural” project 
postcard, bumper 
sticker, pin, dog or cat 
collar, tote bag, pen, 
baseball cap, iPhone 
case, coffee/tea mug, 
water bottle, notebook, 
beret, charm bracelet, 
scarf, tie, bow tie, and 
t-shirt 
$2,500 9 $22,500 Two tickets to a test 
screening in LA or 
NYC followed by a 
filmmakers Q&A, 
where you’ll get to give 
all your feedback 
(travel and 
accommodations not 
included).  “Thank 
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you” in the credits of 
the film.  DVD of the 
final film, and any five 
of the following: a “Be 
Natural” project 
postcard, bumper 
sticker, pin, dog or cat 
collar, tote bag, pen, 
baseball cap, iPhone 
case, coffee/tea mug, 
water bottle, notebook, 
beret, charm bracelet, 
scarf, tie, bow tie, and 
t-shirt 
$5,000   1 $5,000 Spend the day with the 
filmmakers in LA 
(travel and 
accommodations not 
included) to review the 
research and behind the 
scenes action in telling 
Alice’s amazing story.  
DVD of the final film, 
and any five of the 
following: a “Be 
Natural” project 
postcard, bumper 
sticker, pin, dog or cat 
collar, tote bag, pen, 
baseball cap, iPhone 
case, coffee/tea mug, 
water bottle, notebook, 
beret, charm bracelet, 
scarf, tie, bow tie, and 
t-shirt 
29 
It is common for crowdfunding campaigns to attract a relatively 
large number of contributors who provide relatively small contribution 
                                                          
 29.  Id. (some descriptions in the “Reward” column are direct quotes, others are modified for 
grammar, style, and punctuation). 
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amounts.
30
  However, the smaller number of contributors who provide 
larger contributions often provide total contributions that exceed the total 
contributions provided by a large number of small amount contributors.
31
  
The following sections will discuss the income tax consequences of the 
five crowdfunding models using facts from the crowdfunding endeavor 
above, as applicable. 
II. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CROWDFUNDING MODELS 4 AND 5 (LOANS 
& EQUITY) 
A. Lending Model 
The current Code addresses the income tax consequences when 
crowdfunding is based on bona fide loans that provide for the payment of 
interest and is well settled.  Money received by virtue of a bona fide loan 
is not income to the recipient,
32
 while it is also clear that interest paid by 
a borrower is income to the lender.
33
  The Code addresses many issues in 
situations where loans are the basis of raising money through 
crowdfunding.  Some of these issues include: income from the discharge 
of indebtedness,
34
 exclusions from income when indebtedness is 
discharged,
35
 the tax consequences of loans with below-market interest 
rates,
36
 and the exclusion of cancelled debt from income when the facts 
support a conclusion that it was a gift.
37
 
B. Equity Model 
Code section 351(a) states that: “No gain or loss shall be recognized 
if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely 
in exchange for stock in such corporation and immediately after the 
exchange such person or persons are in control (as defined in section 
368(c)) of the corporation.”
38
  Therefore, assuming all of the 
                                                          
 30.  Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 1, 1 (2014). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 3–4 (3d ed. 2013). 
 33.  Treas. Reg. § 1.61-7(a) (2015) (“As a general rule, interest received by or credited to the 
taxpayer constitutes gross income and is fully taxable.”). 
 34.  I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2012).  
 35.  Id. §§ 108, 1017 (2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 36.  Id. § 7872 (2012). 
 37.  Id. § 102 (2012). 
 38.  Id. § 351(a) (2012). 
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requirements are met, there is no gain or loss recognized when 
participants provide money to a crowdfunding campaign for which they 
receive ownership in a corporation, since money qualifies as property.
39
  
If the investor receives “rewards” or “perks” from the corporation in 
addition to an equity position, the Code clearly states that the investor 
shall recognize gain (but not loss) to the extent of the fair market value of 
the property received.
40
  For example, those investors who provided $35 
and received a digital copy of the completed film in addition to an equity 
position would be required to recognize gain to the extent of the fair 
market value of the digital download of the film.
41
  Assuming the control 
requirement of section 351(a) is met, these taxpayers received a $35 
value of stock in addition to the fair market value of the digital download 
of the film (assumed to be valued at $20) for a total of $55 received.  The 
$55 received, less the basis of the property provided to the corporation 
($35 cash), leaves $20 of realized taxable income.
42
  These taxpayers 




If the investment is in a partnership vehicle and no perks or rewards 
are provided, it is also clear that no gain or loss will be recognized by the 
partners (that is, crowdfunding investors) in exchange for the ownership 
interest.
44
  For example, if an individual gives a partnership $100 for a 
partnership interest and receives no property back, then no gain or loss 
will be recognized and the partner’s basis in the partnership would be 
$100.
45
  The tax treatment of rewards or perks received from the 
partnership is clear in the Code, but the ultimate tax treatment depends 
                                                          
 39.  See id.; see also E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1214 
(Ct. Cl. 1973) (including money in definition of property).  See supra note 22 and accompanying 
text.   
 40.  I.R.C. § 351(b).  For clarity and brevity, the above example does not address the results if 
the taxpayers provide property wherein the recognized gain would be the lesser of the value of the 
boot received or the gain created by the difference between the basis and the fair market value of the 
property provided by the taxpayer. 
 41.  See Green & van Sluijs, supra note 24.   
 42.  This occurs because the gain recognized under Code section 351 will not exceed the gain 
that would be recognized if section 351 did not apply to the transaction.  See I.R.C. § 351(b); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.351-2 (2015).   
 43.  Code section 358(a) provides rules for determining the basis of the taxpayers’ stock and 
boot received.  The basis of the stock received by the taxpayers in the above example is the value of 
the property provided by the taxpayer ($35), decreased by the fair market value of other property 
received by the taxpayer ($20), and increased by the amount of gain recognized by the taxpayer in 
the exchange ($20).  The basis of the stock received by the taxpayers in the above example is 
therefore $35.  
 44.  I.R.C. § 721(a) (2012). 
 45.  Id. 
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on the facts and circumstances of each transaction.
46
  The inquiry starts 
with the understanding that, in general, distributions of property from a 
partnership to a partner do not result in gain to the partner if the partner’s 
basis in the partnership exceeds the value of the distribution from the 
partnership and the distributions are out of operating cash flow, 
guaranteed payments, or preferred returns.
47
  If the above example is 
changed so that the partner receives property back that has a fair market 
value of $10, then, if the form of the transaction is respected, the partner 
would not recognize gain on the distribution.
48
  However, this 
nonrecognition treatment may not be applicable in situations where a 
partner receives property back from the partnership and it is determined 
that the transaction is a sale, which would alter the tax consequences.
49
  
The regulations issued by the Treasury Department provide guidance in 
determining the tax consequences in both crowdfunding and non-
crowdfunding transactions that involve the transfer of money in 
exchange for a partnership interest with the additional distribution of 
property to the partner.
50
  If the above example were a crowdfunding 
campaign, then an exchange where a partner gives the partnership $100 
for a partnership interest and receives a DVD of the film to be produced 
in the crowdfunding campaign (that is, receives “property”) may be 
characterized as a sale or exchange “if, in fact, the distribution was made 
in order to effect an exchange of property between two or more of the 
partners or between the partnership and a partner.”
51
  As such, if a 
transfer of money or property by a partnership to a partner occurs with a 
transfer of money or property from a partner to a partnership and 
                                                          
 46.  See, e.g., id. § 707(a) (2012) (controlling partners not acting in capacity as partner); Treas. 
Reg. §§ 1.707-1, -3, -6 (2015) (regulating partners not acting in partner capacity, disguised sales of 
property to partnerships, and disguised sales by partnership to partner, respectively). 
 47.  I.R.C. §§ 721–22, 731–32 (2012). 
 48.  There is no recognition of gain or loss unless Code sections 704(c)(1)(B), 737, or 751(b) 
apply.  The recipient of the property takes a transferred basis and the partner’s outside basis is 
reduced by the transferred basis in the property distributed.  Id. §§ 731(a), 732(a), 733.   
 49.  Treasury Regulation section 1.721-1(a) provides that 
[s]ection 721 . . . shall not apply to a transaction between a partnership and a partner not 
acting in his capacity as a partner since such a transaction is governed by section 
707 . . . .  In all cases, the substance of the transaction will govern, rather than its 
form. . . .  Thus, if the transfer of property by the partner to the partnership results in the 
receipt by the partner of money or other consideration, . . . the transaction will be treated 
as a sale or exchange under section 707 . . . rather than as a contribution under section 
721. 
 50.  Treas. Reg. §§ 1.707-1 through -9. 
 51.  Id. § 1.731-1(c)(3)(ii) (2015).  Rules similar to those in section 1.707-3 “apply in 
determining whether a transfer of property by a partnership to a partner and one or more transfers of 
money or other consideration by that partner to the partnership are treated as a sale of property, in 
whole or in part, to the partner.” Id. § 1.707-6(a); see also id. § 1.721-1. 
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together these transactions are determined to be a sale or exchange, then 
nonrecognition of Code sections 721 and 731 is not applicable and the 
partner must recognize income from the transaction.
52
  In general, the 
first step is to review each transaction so as to determine whether a sale 
has occurred.
53
  To be considered a sale the following two requirements 
must be satisfied: first, the money or other consideration would not have 
been transferred if the property was not also transferred; and second, in 
the event that the transfers are not made simultaneously, then the 
subsequent transfer does not depend on the risks of operating the 
partnership.
54
  There is a rebuttable presumption that transactions 
occurring within two years of each other are a sale.
55
 
The Regulations provide a nonexclusive list of ten factors that tend 
to prove the existence of a sale under Code section 707.
56
  As applied to 
crowdfunding, of the ten factors the following four would support the 
conclusion that providing perks or rewards in addition to a partnership 
interest is a sale as provided in the Regulations: (1) the timing and 
amount of the transfer of the perks or rewards can be determined with 
reasonable certainty at the time the money is provided to the partnership 
by the investor;
57
 (2) when the partnership spends an investor’s money 
then that investor has a legally enforceable right to the promised perks or 
rewards;
58
 (3) other investors must provide money contributions as a 
prerequisite to the partnership’s ability to provide the perks or rewards;
59
 
and (4) a partner is not required to return a perk or reward once it is 
provided by the partnership.
60
  It should be recognized that Code section 
707 was enacted to curb abuses by partnerships in which there is an 
attempt to “avoid the recognition of gain on the contributed property by 
the contributor.”
61
  While it could be argued that providing perks and 
                                                          
 52.  I.R.C. § 707. 
 53.  Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3 (discussing treatment of sales). 
 54.  Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(1)(i)–(ii).  There are exceptions to this rule contained in Treasury 
Regulation section 1.707-4, for example, guaranteed payments for capital and reasonable preferred 
returns. Id. § 1.707-4. 
 55.  Id. § 1.707-3(c)(1).  Transfers made more than two years apart are presumed not to be a 
sale. Id. § 1.707-3(d).  
 56.  Id. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(i)–(x).   
 57.  Id. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(i).   
 58.  Id. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(ii).  See generally PAUL BATTISTA, INDEPENDENT FILM PRODUCING: 
HOW TO PRODUCE A LOW-BUDGET INDEPENDENT FILM (2013) (explaining the legal obligations 
when providing crowdfunding perks or rewards). 
 59.  Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(iv). 
 60.  Id. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(x). 
 61.  LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K 228 
(4th ed. 2011). 
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rewards when a partner provides cash are not the types of transactions 
Code section 707 was enacted to address, nevertheless, reviewing the 
facts of providing perks and rewards as applied to the list of the above 
factors will most likely lead to the conclusion that the provision of perks 
and rewards are sales under Code section 707 and would require the 
recognition of gain to the extent of the fair market value of the perks and 
rewards received.  Using the example above, those partnership investors 
who provided $35 and received a digital copy of the completed film 
would be required to recognize gain to the extent of the fair market value 
of the digital download of the film.  These taxpayers received a $35 
value of ownership in the partnership in addition to the fair market value 
of the digital download of the film (assumed to be valued at $20) for a 
total of $55 received, less the basis of the property provided to the 




III. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CROWDFUNDING MODEL 1 (DONATIONS) 
AND MODELS 2 AND 3 (REWARD & PRE-PURCHASE) WHEN USING A 
TAX-EXEMPT ENTITY 
A crowdfunding campaign seeking to utilize the benefits of tax-
exempt status can either create a tax-exempt entity through which a 
project will be completed or utilize a fiscal sponsorship model wherein 
the crowdfunding party contracts with an existing tax-exempt entity in 
order to utilize the latter’s existing tax-exempt status.
63
  The tax 
consequences when using a tax-exempt entity in crowdfunding are 
addressed by current tax laws, primarily in Code sections 501 through 
515 and Code section 170.
64
  The donation, pre-purchase, and reward 
crowdfunding models are the primary models used for tax-exempt 
crowdfunding.
65
  In general, contributions received by a tax-exempt 
organization are not subject to income tax.
66
  For example, those 
                                                          
 62.  I.R.C. § 707(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.707-1, -3, -6.  
 63.  See Creator Questions, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/creator+questions?ref=faq_nav#GettStar (last visited Sept. 29, 
2015) (“If you’re not running the project as a nonprofit, but instead working with a 501(c)(3) fiscal 
sponsor, be sure that your account details (specifically, the ‘Account’ tab of your project) is set up 
by the 501(c)(3).  You must also include details about the organization on the project page.”); see 
also How to Raise Tax-Deductible Funds, INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-
us/articles/202444736? (last visited Sept. 29, 2015) (explaining how to set up a campaign to raise 
money for a 501(c)(3) organization). 
 64.  I.R.C. §§ 501–15, 170 (2012). 
 65.  But see supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. 
 66.  I.R.C. §§ 501–05. 
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contributors who provided $1, $10, and $15 in exchange for a “thank 
you” from the producers of the Guy-Blaché film gave a total amount of 
$7,363.
67
  This donation model of crowdfunding, which involves an 
entity that has tax-exempt status, would exclude from income taxation 
the $7,363 received by the documentary filmmakers.
68
  In addition, it 
would provide a charitable-contribution deduction to each contributor up 
to the amount each provided.
69
 
The pre-purchase and reward crowdfunding models have similar tax 
consequences, but both are different from the donation model.
70
  The sale 
of goods or services by a tax-exempt entity will not result in income tax 
to the entity if those activities are engaged in furtherance of its exempt 
activities.
71
  Income tax may be avoided by an exempt organization even 
if the activities are not in furtherance of the entity’s exempt purpose if 
those activities are an “insubstantial part” of the exempt organization’s 
activities.
72
  Activities that are not in furtherance of an exempt activity 
and are more than an “insubstantial part” of the overall activities may be 
taxed at regular rates if determined to create “unrelated business taxable 
income.”
73
  “Unrelated business taxable income” is defined in Code 
section 512 as “gross income derived by any organization from any 
unrelated trade or business . . . regularly carried on by it,” which is 
determined by the facts and circumstances of each situation.
74
  The 
bottom line is that the perks and rewards will not be taxable income to 
the exempt organization if they are in furtherance of the entity’s exempt 
purpose or are an “insubstantial part” of its overall activity, but the 
income they generate could become taxable if the facts and 
circumstances support a conclusion that it is derived from an unrelated 
trade or business that is regularly carried on.
75
 
The act of providing goods and services (perks and rewards) to 
contributors by a tax-exempt organization utilizing pre-purchase and 
                                                          
 67.  Green & van Sluijs, supra note 24. 
 68.  I.R.C. § 501. 
 69.  Id. § 170. 
 70.  See infra Part IV. 
 71.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 72.  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2015) (providing an “operational test” that allows for an 
“insubstantial part” of the exempt organization’s activities to not be in furtherance of its exempt 
purpose). 
 73.  I.R.C. § 511(a). 
 74.  See id. § 513 (explaining circumstances of unrelated trade or business); see also Treas. 
Reg. § 1.513-1 (defining “unrelated business taxable income”). 
 75.  The determination of the facts and circumstances that would result in unrelated business 
taxable income is beyond the scope of this Article.   
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reward crowdfunding models also has tax consequences for the 
contributors.  It is clear that contributions made to tax-exempt 
organizations provide the contributor with a charitable deduction.  
However, a charitable deduction is not allowed if the contributor receives 
goods and services in exchange for their contribution unless the payment 
provided exceeds the fair market value of the goods and services 
received, and at the time the payment is made the contributor intends to 
make a payment that exceeds the fair market value of the goods and 
services received.
76
  The first part of the latter rule is objective, that is, 
either the amount provided for the goods and services exceeds the fair 
market value of the goods and services, or it does not.  The second 
inquiry seeks to determine if the donor’s intention is to make a 
contribution or gift at the time that the donation is made.  If the two 
requirements are met, then the amount of the charitable deduction the 
contributor is allowed to claim is limited to the value of the property 
provided by the contributor over the amount of the fair market value of 
the goods and services the contributor receives.
77
  For example, those 
contributors who provided $35 in exchange for a digital download of the 
film could claim a charitable deduction in the amount of $15 if the fair 
market value of the digital download was $20.  In essence, there is a 
“dual payment” in which a single payment results in two different tax 




An interesting issue arises when a tax-exempt crowdfunding 
organization lends money to third parties without charging interest for 
the use of the funds, for example, Kiva.  Although it is clear that 
charitable contributions are allowed as a deduction in determining the 
income taxes of the contributor,
79
 interest-free loans are not allowed as a 
charitable deduction.
80
  Professor Lawsky explains that interest-free 
loans donate the time value of money,
81
 which is a donation of a partial 
                                                          
 76.  Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104; United States v. Am. Bar 
Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116–17 (1986). 
 77.  Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h).  “The congressional purpose for allowing the donor a deduction 
is to encourage the infusion of private funds into the public sector.  The charitable functions that the 
donee organizations perform serve a governmental purpose, and many of those functions would have 
to be undertaken by the government if charities were not there to perform them.” Douglas A. Kahn 
& Jeffrey H. Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts” - The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private 
and Charitable “Gifts” and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 513–14 (2002). 
 78.  Kahn & Kahn, supra note 77, at 502. 
 79.  I.R.C. § 170(a)(1). 
 80.  Lawsky, supra note 21, at 1534. 
 81.  Id. at 1535. 
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interest in property that is clearly prohibited as a charitable deduction 
under the regulations.
82
  Professor Lawsky’s article argues convincingly 
that the law should be reformed so as to allow a charitable deduction for 
foregone interest on loans in these crowdfunding situations.
83
 
IV. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CROWDFUNDING MODEL 1 (DONATIONS) 
AND MODELS 2 AND 3 (REWARD & PRE-PURCHASE) 
A. Income Taxation 
It is well settled that income subject to taxation is determined under 
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
84
 and Code section 61.
85
  The 
Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass provided that income is “undeniable 
accessions to wealth, . . . over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion.”
86
  The Code and the Regulations also provide an all-
encompassing definition which states that “income means all income 
from whatever source derived,” unless it is otherwise excluded by law.
87
  
The Code also provides a non-exclusive list of items that are taxable 
income, which include the following: “[c]ompensation for services . . . ; 
[g]ross income derived from business; [g]ains derived from dealings in 
property; [and] interest.”
88
  For example, the contributors to the Guy-
Blaché film provide income for the producers when, in exchange for 
money, they “spend the day with the filmmakers in Los Angeles (travel 
and accommodations are not included) to review the research and behind 
the scenes action in telling Alice’s amazing story.”
89
  Put simply, the 
filmmakers are providing their time, knowledge, and experiences in 
                                                          
 82.  Id. at 1527. 
 83.  Id. at 1546–51. 
 84.  348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).  See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 
11 FLA. TAX REV. 295, 296 & n.1 (2011) [hereinafter Defining Income], for a clarification of 
accepting Glenshaw Glass as defining income.  The Glenshaw Glass definition is rooted in the Haig-
Simons definition of income which states: “Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of 
(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store 
of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.” Theodore P. Seto, When 
Is a Game Only a Game?: The Taxation of Virtual Worlds, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027, 1040 & n.58, 
1041 (2008) (quoting HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938)).  As Professor 
Theodore P. Seto points out, this is simply “income equals consumption plus change in net worth” 
and it is “generally only invoked by scholars.” Id. at 1040 n.58, 1041. 
 85.  I.R.C. § 61 (2012). 
 86.  Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431. 
 87.  I.R.C. § 61(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (2015). 
 88.  I.R.C. § 61(a).  The regulations add that “gross income includes income realized in any 
form, whether in money, property, or services.” Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1. 
 89.  Supra note 29 and accompanying table. 
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making the film in exchange for the contributors’ money.  Because these 
perks are within crowdfunding they may appear to be simply a nice 
gesture and not the provision of services in exchange for money.  To 
draw an analogy, if Steven Spielberg received money from the public to 
be allowed to spend time with him as he explained and reviewed research 
and behind the scenes action in making one of his films, the receipt of 
money for his services would clearly be income to Spielberg.  Also, 
those contributors who provided $35 in exchange for a digital download 
of the film provided the producers with gross income that was derived 
from business.
90
  In addition, when contributors provided $99 in 
exchange for a DVD copy of Alice Guy-Blaché’s film, A Fool and His 
Money, the producers received gains derived from dealings in property.
91
  
Therefore, based on the plain language of the law it could be concluded 
that funds obtained from crowdfunding should be accounted for by the 
recipients as taxable income.  In fact, Kickstarter has provided guidance 
stating that the money obtained on Kickstarter is income.
92
  But, at the 
same time, the IRS has declined to clarify its position on the tax 
treatment of crowdfunding. 
Although it is reasonable at this point in the analysis to consider the 
money received in crowdfunding as income, there are still issues that 
need exploration.  The inclusiveness of the definition of income would 
suggest that all accessions to wealth, when realized, are income.
93
  
However, as Professor Bittker noted, “[w]hen we turn to the field of 
income taxation . . . we do not begin with a consensus on the meaning of 
income, but with a myriad of arguments about what should be taxed, 
when, and to whom”
94
—to which Professors Abreu and Greenstein 
added, “[t]he arguments have not abated in the intervening years—if 
anything they are now more intense.”
95
  There are numerous examples of 
                                                          
 90.  See I.R.C. § 61(a)(2) (defining gross income as including “[g]ross income derived from 
business”). 
 91.  See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (defining gross income as including “[g]ains derived from dealings in 
property”). 
 92.  Kickstarter and Taxes: A Guide for Your Accountant, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/taxes (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). 
 93.  See Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 Hastings 
L.J. 1, 29 (2007) (“The realization requirement boils down to timing.  Before an accession to wealth 
is reportable as gross income, it must be realized.  This requirement mediates between the economic 
idea of income and the practical needs of a system dependent on periodic reporting of transactions 
that may or may not have closed.  It has less to do with economic theory and more to do with finding 
an administrable legal concept of gross income.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 94.  Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 925, 985 (1967). 
 95.  Defining Income, supra note 84, at 340.  A reason cited for such disagreements has been 
the failure of Glenshaw Glass to identify the factors that determine if there is an “accession to 
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activities that meet the Glenshaw Glass definition of income that are 
nevertheless either not immediately taxed or even excluded altogether 
from taxable income by either the IRS, the courts, or the legislature.  
Examples in a business context include the personal use of frequent-flier 
miles obtained from an employer
96
 and other employee fringe benefits.
97
  
Examples from personal activity include self-benefitting services,
98
 
baseballs caught by spectators at a game,
99
 free samples from 
businesses,
100
 animals caught by hunters,
101
 and minerals obtained from 
mining.
102
  Professor Abreu and Professor Greenstein have concluded 
that “neither the courts, nor tax scholars, nor the IRS have articulated a 
comprehensive theory that explains all of these specific outcomes.”
103
  
However, Professor Abreu and Professor Greenstein provide a workable 
explanation, concluding that these examples illustrate that the definition 
of income is better understood as a standard and not a rule.
104
  That is, 
the income definition in Glenshaw Glass should not be approached as a 
rule that is solely consistent with economics but as a standard that allows 
for the consideration of other values in determining whether or not there 
is taxable income.
105
  The scope of these values can be limited to 
                                                          
wealth.” Id. at 339–40.  
 96.  Leandra Lederman, “Stranger than Fiction”: Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1620, 1646 n.138 (2007). 
 97.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N No. 15-B, EMPLOYER’S 
TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS 5–20 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf. 
 98.  Camp, supra note 93, at 38; see also Defining Income, supra note 84, at 297 n.9 (“Every 
major tax casebook and treatise acknowledges that imputed income is not income for tax 
purposes.”). 
 99.  Defining Income, supra note 84, at 344 (“Those tax lawyers [IRS] would probably agree 
that equity and efficiency point toward taxing the value of the baseball (because it is an accession to 
wealth clearly realized within the taxpayer’s dominion if she keeps it) . . . .  But as lawyers working 
for the IRS they understand the difficulty of administering such a conclusion, not only because of the 
difficulty of valuation but also because it necessarily implies taxing all caught baseballs, including 
those of relatively little value.  Such a result, while equitable and efficient, is unadministrable, not 
only because people would rebel but also because it would be impossible for the IRS to enforce it.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  
 100.  Id. at 317–18. 
 101.  Camp, supra note 93, at 65 (“Acquisition of virtual items would therefore be like a hunter 
who takes game, a fisher who takes fish, or a farmer who harvests the crop.”). 
 102.  Adam S. Chodorow, Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Virtual Income, 75 TENN. L. REV. 
695, 706 & n.73 (2008) (citing Treasurey Regulation section 1.61-4 regarding self-grown crops); 
Lawrence A. Zelenak & Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Taxing Baseballs and Other Found Property, 84 
TAX NOTES 1299, 1302–04 (1999) (discussing commercial fisherman, big game hunters, prospectors 
and miners, and treasure hunters). 
 103.  Defining Income, supra note 84, at 298. 
 104.  Id. at 339. 
 105.  Id. at 344–46. 
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traditional tax policy standards such as administrability and equity,
106
 or 
it can be an all-things-considered inquiry.
107
  In other words, it can also 
account for other values such as privacy, social cooperation, and 
improvement of the standard of living.
108
  Regardless of the scope of 
values applied, it is clear that the consideration of values other than 
raising revenue from realized accessions to wealth best explains why the 
latter examples have been determined to fall outside taxable income, 




It is interesting to note that the IRS has yet to provide guidance that 
specifically states that funds received in crowdfunding campaigns are 
taxable income.
110
  It could be argued that there are four possibilities that 
might explain the IRS’s lack of definitive guidance on this issue.  First, 
the IRS may have concluded that—similar to self-benefitting services, 
child support, and baseballs caught by spectators—crowdfunding 
revenue is not income that the IRS will use its resources to tax.
111
  
Second, it may have concluded that, like cash welfare payments, such 
funds are not taxable income.
112
  Third, it may have concluded that 
crowdfunding encompasses too many facts and circumstances to make it 
possible to take a bright-line position, and it will only lead to litigation 
similar to cases involving free samples from businesses and fringe 
benefits for employees.
113
  Fourth, it does not currently have a conclusion 
because it has not yet internally examined all the tax consequences of 
crowdfunding.  The current lack of IRS guidance, lack of case law, and 
lack of legislative action specifically addressing the income tax issues of 
crowdfunding requires an exploration of priorities that may outweigh the 
primary objective of raising revenue.  Such an exploration may support a 
conclusion that crowdfunding is income that should not be taxed even 
though these funds meet the definition of income under Glenshaw Glass 
                                                          
 106.  Id. at 345. 
 107.  See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule: A Better Way to Understand 
the Definition of Income, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 101, 105, 107 (2012) [hereinafter It’s Not a Rule] 
(discussing varying approaches to defining income, including rejection of a rigid model in favor of 
an all-things-considered analysis). 
 108.  Id. at 107–09 (discussing and citing Douglas A. Kahn, Exclusion from Income of 
Compensation for Services and Pooling of Labor Occurring in a Noncommercial Setting, 11 FLA. 
TAX REV. 683, 687–89 (2011)). 
 109.  Defining Income, supra note 84, at 299–300. 
 110.  See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
 111.  See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text; see also It’s Not a Rule, supra note 107, at 
103. 
 112.  It’s Not a Rule, supra note 107, at 103.  
 113.  Defining Income, supra note 84, at 313, 318. 
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and Code section 61.  Certain assumed values could be viewed as 
holding greater priority than that of raising revenue from crowdfunding.  
At this point, it is worth exploring these values. 
B. Values that Have Been Determined to Exclude Certain Activities 
from Taxable Income 
As noted above, a number of activities have been found to meet the 
definition of income under Glenshaw Glass and Code section 61 but 
nevertheless have not been taxed.
114
  Before examining crowdfunding, so 
as to determine if it should be excluded from income taxation, it is 
necessary to understand the values that have been put forward to support 
the exclusion from income tax in the case of other activities like those 
mentioned above.  Many of the values supporting tax exclusion in those 
examples have been administrative and include the following: (1) the 
lack of ascertainable fair market value of the property subject to tax; (2) 
the risk of noncompliance by taxpayers; (3) the lack of liquidity to pay 
taxes owed; (4) the costs associated with reporting such income and 
enforcing payment; and (5) the small amounts subject to tax resulting in 
an inefficient allocation of tax enforcement resources.
115
  Other values 
supporting exclusion include the desire to avoid government intrusion 
into citizens’ privacy and the overall detrimental tax effects from taxing 
income where deductions are disallowed.
116
  The question is: how do 
these values apply to crowdfunding?  The following section examines 
crowdfunding models 1, 2, and 3 to determine if they may indicate a 
determination that funds received through these models could be 
excluded from income taxation. 
C. The Application of the Above Values to Model 1 (Donation) and 
Models 2 and 3 (Reward and Pre-Purchase) to Determine Possible 
Income Tax Exclusion 
Funding campaigns created in Kickstarter, IndieGoGo, and similar 
crowdfunding sites are rarely only Model 1.  For example, if every 
donation amount in the Guy-Blaché film campaign yielded a reward of a 
“thank you” then it would not only be a very unusual crowdfunding 
                                                          
 114.  See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 115.  Chodorow, supra note 102, at 740. 
 116.  Joseph M. Dodge, Accessions to Wealth, Realization of Gross Income, and Dominion and 
Control: Applying the “Claim of Right Doctrine” to Found Objects, Including Record-Setting 
Baseballs, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 685, 704, 726 (2000). 
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campaign, but also one that has not provided any goods or services in 
exchange for the funds.  Discussed below are more common campaigns 
that do contain rewards of goods and/or services provided to the parties 
supplying the funds for the project.  Whether these transactions are a gift 
for income tax purposes will be discussed in Part V.  For purposes of this 
discussion, the first step is to acknowledge that receipt of funds in Model 
1 is income under Glenshaw Glass, Code section 61, and the regulations 
under Code section 61.
117
  Further, the examples of activities that have 
been removed from taxable income based on other values—for example, 
free samples, caught baseballs, etc.
118
—would not appear to change this 
conclusion. 
An important differentiating factor in the receipt of crowdfunding 
property compared to other nontaxed property is that the property 
received in crowdfunding is cash.  Cash has an ascertainable fair market 
value and there is generally no liquidity issue regarding the taxes owed. 
Further, crowdfunding activities occur through intermediary companies 
on the Internet, which renders the activity subject to relatively easy 
reporting and enforcement, and also provides a lower risk of 
noncompliance by taxpayers, while at the same time reducing 
enforcement as an issue of the government’s intrusion into citizens’ 
privacy.  In addition, as reported above, the amounts subject to tax are 
currently billions of dollars (and rising),
119
 therefore, on a cost/benefit 
basis, enforcement is an efficient allocation of government resources that 
is likely to result in relatively large amounts of taxable income. 
On the other hand, there is a factor that may support the case for not 
taxing crowdfunding money in that it may give rise to administrative 
burdens.  Deductions that are related to crowdfunded projects may be 
disallowed.  This may create an overall detrimental effect on taxpayers 
and economic activity as well as giving rise to a liquidity issue if these 
funds are taxed.  Most crowdfunding sites require the party requesting 
the funds to clearly state what the funds will be spent on,
120
 and many of 
the crowdfunding campaigns promise to spend the money on a project or 
activity that, for tax purposes, may be considered a for-profit business 
                                                          
 117.  See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 118.  See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 119.  See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 120.  Examples of crowdfunding sites that require a crowdfunder to clearly state what the funds 
will be used for include Kickstarter.com, IndieGoGo.com, RocketHub.com, and PledgeMusic.com. 
See, e.g., Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter+basics?ref=footer (last visited Sep. 29, 2015) 
(requiring projects to state a “clear goal”). 
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endeavor.
121
  The Code contains many limitations that restrict or disallow 
deductions relating to money spent on for-profit endeavors or in a trade 
or business as well as restricting or disallowing funds spent on personal, 
living, or family expenses.
122
  For example, expenditures on films in for-
profit endeavors, such as the Guy-Blaché film, are generally 
capitalized
123
 and deducted as depreciation
124
 using one of the available 
depreciation methods.
125
  Each of the depreciation methods allows only a 
percentage of the total expenses to be deducted each year over many 
future years.
126
  The taxpayer making the film is required to include the 
full $200,000 in gross income in the year the funds are received, but will 
only be allowed to claim a small amount as a depreciation deduction 
each year.
127
  If the taxpayer chooses the straight-line method of 
depreciation, where it is determined that the film has a useful life of 
twenty years and a salvage value of zero, then the taxpayer can deduct 
$10,000 per year for twenty years.
128
  In the first year, the taxpayer will 
have $190,000 in taxable income yet will have spent all or most of all of 
the $200,000 on creating the project, as legally required through the 
crowdfunding site, thereby leaving the taxpayer with a sizable amount of 
tax owed with no funds with which to pay. 
This raises a clear “inability to pay” issue for the taxpayer based on 
the lack of liquidity.  One can easily see the possibility of the negative 
economic result, namely, a reduction in the number of crowdfunding 
projects because of the income tax liability that would arise.
129
  However, 
                                                          
 121.  See id. (noting the variety of projects and project purposes allowed on Kickstarter.com). 
 122.  For examples see Code sections 183, activities not engaged in for profit; 67, 2% floor on 
miscellaneous itemized deductions, including subparagraph (c)’s application to pass-through entities; 
465, at-risk rules; 469, limitations on passive activity losses and credits; and 262, disallowing 
deductions for personal, living, and family expenses. 
 123.  I.R.C. § 263A(a)(1)(B), (b)(1) (2012).  
 124.  Id. § 167(a) (2012).  Taxpayers’ ability to deduct film and television production expenses 
in the year incurred rather than over a number of future years under Code section 167 expired as of 
December 31, 2013. Id. § 181 (Supp. 2014).  Film and television productions are not eligible to use 
the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (“MACRS”) under Code section 168(f)(3) or 
amortization under Code section 197.  
 125.  The straight-line and income-forecast methods are applicable to motion pictures. Id. § 
167(a), (g).  
 126.  Id. § 167(g) (income-forecast method); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1(a) (“Under the straight 
line method the cost or other basis of the property less its estimated salvage value is deductible in 
equal annual amounts over the period of the estimated useful life of the property.”). 
 127.  See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
 128.  Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1(a).  The numbers chosen in the example are for brevity and clarity 
and do not necessarily reflect the best method of depreciation allowance. 
 129.  See Daniel Shaviro, A Case Study for Tax Reformers: The Taxation of Employee Awards 
and Other Business Gifts, 4 VA. TAX REV. 241, 246 (1985) (noting that, in the context of taxing 
employee benefits, “it can be argued that taxing employee awards is inefficient, in that it would 
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these administrative challenges would not necessarily remove 
crowdfunding receipts from taxable income because the funds received 
are cash which gives taxpayers the opportunity to budget for the payment 
of income tax by segregating the funds for taxes from the total funds 
received in the crowdfunding campaign.  The taxpayer would simply be 
required to include the taxes to be owed in the budget that the taxpayer 
creates when planning the overall crowdfunding endeavor.
130
 
The tax consequences of for-profit endeavors (above) is substantially 
similar to endeavors that are not engaged in for profit (so called “hobby 
losses”), that is, receipt of taxable income but the inability to deduct 
costs incurred in spending such taxable income.
131
  Although different 
Code sections will apply to restrict or disallow the deductions, the 
conclusion remains the same: a taxpayer in an endeavor not engaged in 
for profit should simply be required to include the taxes to be owed in the 
original budget of the crowdfunding endeavor. 
Crowdfunding models with rewards, including where the reward is a 
pre-purchase of the item to be produced in the crowdfunding campaign, 
provide goods and/or services to the parties providing the funds.  These 
transactions are determined under Code sections 61 and 1001, and it is 
clear that these transactions are taxable income.
132
  For example, in the 
Guy-Blaché film campaign funds received in the amount of $35 in 
exchange for a pre-purchase of the final film are transactions covered 
under Code section 61 and section 1001.
133
  An example of services in 
the campaign would be the reward provided in exchange for a $5,000 
contribution as identified in the chart above, namely, “spend the day with 
the filmmakers in Los Angeles (travel and accommodations are not 
included) to review the research and behind the scenes action in telling 
Alice’s amazing story.”
134
  None of the values that have previously 
supported an exclusion of otherwise taxable income
135
 apply to these 
                                                          
destroy the economic value of a particular form of behavior”).  
 130.  See Chodorow, supra note 102, at 739 (providing examples of items federal tax laws have 
included in income although there is a clear inability-to-pay/liquidity issue). 
 131.  If Code section 183 is applicable, then the taxpayer may only deduct expenses related to 
the activity to the extent of income from that activity.  I.R.C. § 183(a)–(b).  Code section 67 (2% 
floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions) and Code section 68 (overall limit on itemized 
deductions) limit an individual taxpayer’s ability to claim itemized deductions. 
 132.  See I.R.C. § 61; see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-2 to -3, -6. 
 133.  See I.R.C. § 1001(b) (“The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property 
shall be the sum of any money received . . . .”). 
 134.  See supra note 29 and accompanying table; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (“If the services are 
rendered at a stipulated price, such price will be presumed to be the fair market value of the 
compensation received in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”).  
 135.  See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
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crowdfunding transactions.  However, there are two issues that are raised 
when services are exchanged for the crowdfunded money: first, assigning 
value to each reward provided in each funding amount; and second, 
determining the value of the services provided.  The taxpayer is required 
to value each good and service (reward) that is provided within each 
funding category in order to allocate costs to each item in determining 
deductions.
136
  Code section 61 and the regulations clearly state that 
funds received for services are valued at the amount received.
137
  The full 
amount received in exchange for more than one reward is taxable 
income.  And, one may easily conclude that the allocation of the fair-
market-value of the total amount of each of the rewards provided by the 
taxpayer-project is an issue relevant to deducting expenses in regard to 
each reward.  This is not an impossible task for the taxpayer to complete 
and would not, therefore, justify removing these rewards from taxable 
income.  This is different than the conclusions reached regarding 
frequent-flier miles and self-benefitting services where it has been 
determined to be too difficult to assign an accurate fair market value to 
each item for income tax purposes.
138
 
V. GIFT TAX LAWS APPLICABLE TO MODEL 1 (DONATION), MODEL 2 
(REWARD), AND MODEL 3 (PRE-PURCHASE) 
A. Introduction and Assumptions 
“Gross income means all income from whatever source derived, 
unless excluded by law.”
139
  As discussed in Part IV above, the funds 
received in crowdfunding campaigns are taxable gross income.  One 
example of a transfer that is excluded from gross income by law is the 
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.
140
  
Therefore, crowdfunding receipts are taxable unless they can be excluded 
as a gift under Code section 102.  However, before discussing the law 
that assesses whether or not crowdfunding receipts may be excluded 
                                                          
 136.  See U.S. TAX COURT, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Rule 142(a), at 96 (2012), 
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/notice.htm (“The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner . . . .”) (to 
navigate URL, scroll down until find Title XIV, click blue hyperlink); see also I.R.C. § 7491 (2012) 
(listing exceptions to the burden of proof rule). 
 137.  I.R.C. § 61; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-1 to -3, -6; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (addressing 
compensation paid other than in cash and stating that, “[i]f the services are rendered at a stipulated 
price, such price will be presumed to be the fair market value of the compensation received in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary”). 
 138.  Camp, supra note 93, at 27–28. 
 139.  Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a). 
 140.  I.R.C. § 102(a) (2012).   
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from income as a gift, there are several issues to be addressed.  First, the 
Code and supporting regulations identify a few specific types of 
payments as ineligible for exclusion as a gift, but it should be noted that 
they provide little guidance regarding the types of payments that are 
considered a gift.
141
  Second, since its inclusion in the Revenue Act of 
1913, legislators have not provided policy reasons supporting the gift 
exclusion.
142
  Such legislative policy guidance could be invaluable in the 
application of the law to new areas such as crowdfunding.
143
  Third, it is 
the IRS’s position regarding the determination of gifts for income tax 
purposes that it will not issue letter rulings or determination letters 
advising taxpayers whether a transfer is a gift within the meaning of 
Code section 102(a).
144
  Fourth, scholars have debated whether or not 
gifts should be excluded from income at all, and some have argued that 
there is no principled rationale for supporting the exclusion of these 
receipts from taxable income.
145
  It must be determined if proper 
reasoning supporting the gift exclusion exists, and if so, whether that 
reasoning assists in evaluating the exclusion of crowdfunding receipts 
specifically.  An assumption underlying this Article is that there is proper 
foundation for the gift tax exclusion from income based on the policy 
that “the payment of an income tax purchases the right to have the taxed 
income used by the taxpayer, or by someone else of the taxpayer’s 
choosing, to acquire and consume societal goods or services.”
146
 
                                                          
 141.  Kahn & Kahn, supra note 77, at 445.  For example, income from gift-property is not also a 
gift excluded from income. I.R.C. § 102(b).  Code section 102 does not apply to “prizes and 
awards,” “scholarships,” or “fellowship grants.” Treas. Reg. § 1.102-1(a).   
 142.  Richard Schmalbeck, Gifts and the Income Tax—An Enduring Puzzle, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 77 (2010).  
 143.  See William A. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word 
“Gift”, 48 MINN. L. REV. 215, 238–46 (1963) (providing a brief survey of the origin and 
development of the income tax, the estate tax, and the gift tax from 1816 to 1954); see also Debra 
Lefler, Comment, “Keeping Books on Romance”: The Gift Exclusion in Nonmarital Relationships, 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1744 n.31 (2011) (listing sources that discuss the gift exclusion). 
 144.  Rev. Proc. 2014-3, 2014-1 I.R.B. 111 (2014) (“There are . . . certain areas in which, 
because of the inherently factual nature of the problems involved, or for other reasons, the Service 
will not issue rulings or determination letters.”). 
 145.  For scholars who argue that there is a principled rationale to support exclusion of gifts from 
taxable income see Douglas A. Kahn, The Taxation of a Gift or Inheritance from an Employer, 64 
TAX LAW 273, 274 n.6 (2010); Kahn & Kahn, supra note 77, at 441; see also Schmalbeck, supra 
note 142, at 63–65.  For scholars arguing that no policy justification exists to support exclusion of 
gifts from taxable income see HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 56–58 (1938); 
Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1182–89 (1978); Klein, supra note 143, at 215, 260–63; Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. 
REV. 1, 28–37 (1992); Lawrence Zelenak, The Reasons for a Consumption Tax and the Tax 
Treatment of Gifts and Bequests, 51 TAX L. REV. 601, 602–03 (1996).   
 146.  Kahn & Kahn, supra note 77, at 444; Kahn, supra note 145, at 278 (“Consumption requires 
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Assuming the latter is a valid assumption, it is next necessary to 
examine the current law to determine when the gift exclusion would 
apply to crowdfunded income.  It should be noted that the types of 
payments that qualify for the gift income-tax exclusion has been left to 
the courts to determine.
147
  Commissioner v. Duberstein has become the 
standard for determining whether a transfer is a gift for income tax 
purposes.
148
  The Supreme Court provided several guidelines in 
Duberstein, which include the following: (1) a gift is determined on a 
case-by-case basis and is basically an issue of fact;
149
 (2) a gift is not 
determined based on the donor’s characterization of the payment, but 
must be based on an objective inquiry;
150
 (3) whether or not a gift has 
occurred is based on consideration of all of the factors;
151
 and (4) the 
determination of a gift must be based on “the application of the fact-
finding tribunal’s experience with the mainsprings of human conduct to 
the totality of the facts of each case.”
152
  Another guideline provided in 
Duberstein is that a gift does not proceed “primarily from . . . ‘any moral 
or legal duty’ or from ‘the incentive of anticipated benefit’ of an 
economic nature,”
153
 but from a “detached and disinterested 
generosity,”
154
 and “out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like 
impulses.”
155




Professor Abreu and Professor Greenstein reached the conclusion 
that the definition of “income” is best understood as a standard and not a 
rule,
157
 and they also suggest that the determination of transfers that 
qualify for gift exclusion from income is a standard and not a rule.
158
  
They expressed it with the following language: 
                                                          
the destruction or preclusive use of property or services.”). 
 147.  See, e.g., Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1960) (discussing whether certain 
payments fit under the Court’s definition of a gift); see also I.R.C. § 102(a) (stating merely that a gift 
is excluded from income without giving any definition).   
 148.  Kahn & Kahn, supra note 77, at 445–46. 
 149.  Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 290. 
 150.  Id. at 286 (“[W]hat the basic reason for his conduct was in fact—the dominant reason that 
explains his action in making the transfer.”). 
 151.  Id. at 288. 
 152.  Id. at 289. 
 153.  Id. at 285 (quoting Bogardus v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937)). 
 154.  Id. (quoting Comm’r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)). 
 155.  Id. (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)). 
 156.  Id. (quoting Bogardus, 302 U.S. at 43).  “What controls is the intention with which 
payment, however voluntary, has been made.” Bogardus, 302 U.S. at 45 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 157.  Defining Income, supra note 84, at 339.   
 158.  It’s Not a Rule, supra note 107, at 112–13. 
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[A] nuanced, multifaceted analysis might be precisely what the 
Duberstein Court intended when it referred to the “nontechnical nature 
of the statutory standard,” and what led it to reject the Government’s 
request to adopt a single-factor, rule-like test under which gifts would 




The assumption in this Article is that the language of the Duberstein 
Court is clear on its face and requires a gift analysis to be a standard 
requiring a nuanced, multifaceted analysis.  The Court’s requirement that 
a determination is based on “consideration of all the factors” and “the 
totality of the facts in each case” clearly means that every fact is to be 
weighed before reaching a conclusion.  Of course, different factors are 
given more weight in different situations, and reasonable people can 
differ regarding which factors are the most important in any given 
situation. 
This Article will adopt two further assumptions regarding the 
application of the gift income tax exclusion as applied to crowdfunding 
receipts.  The first assumption is that the determination of whether a 
transfer is a gift or income should take into account the balance between 
the transferor’s right to expend previously taxed funds as he or she 
desires on the one hand and the basic premise that income to a recipient 
is taxable for the support of the government on the other.
160
  That is, this 
balance must be one of the factors in the “totality of factors” considered 
in making a gift or income determination.  The second assumption is that 
the requirement that a transferor’s intent is “detached and disinterested” 
is not met only if the “primary motive of the donor is selfish.”
161
  This 
assumption is supported by the Duberstein Court’s explanation that the 
goal of the inquiries is to determine “the basic reason for [the 




                                                          
 159.  Id. at 114 (footnote omitted). 
 160.  See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 77, at 467–68. 
 161.  See id. at 478–79.  Professor Douglas A. Kahn and Professor Jeffrey H. Kahn explain that a 
transferor cannot be held to a standard of having no selfish motives, otherwise very few transfers 
would occur. Id.  Further, they point out that “[t]he psychological make-up of human beings is 
complex.  There often are mixed motives for making voluntary transfers.” Id. at 478. 
 162. Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960). 
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B. Crowdfunding and the Gift Tax Implications 
1. Crowdfunding Factors Affecting the Determination of a Gift 
As stated above, Duberstein requires consideration of all factors in 
gift determinations.
163
 The problem is that when it comes to 
crowdfunding, there are no applicable reported cases and there is no IRS 
guidance regarding the gift-tax exclusion.  Even though there is a lack of 
guidance regarding crowdfunding specifically, there are cases that 
provide guidance of a general nature that could be applied to gift 
determinations in the case of crowdfunding.  The following discussion 
will examine the two broadly applicable determinant categories in the 
establishment of a gift exclusion that are present in crowdfunding.  These 
two categories can be viewed as primary factors in the determination of 
the gift exclusion in regard to crowdfunding campaigns. 
The first category is whether the party providing money receives any 
tangible goods or services in exchange for the funds.  The second 
category is the circumstances surrounding the transfer of funds, including 
whether the recipient accepts the funds in the capacity of an individual or 
a business.  The Duberstein Court clearly states that the transferor’s 
intent in making a transfer must be determined in order to be able to 
make a gift determination.  As cited above, the Court also stated that a 
gift is not determined by the donor’s own characterization of the 
payment, but must be based on an objective inquiry.
164
  It is an 
assumption of this Article that although a transferor’s personal reasons 
for providing funds are certain to be varied,
165
 those personal reasons are 
not solely determinative.  As an illustration, each crowdfunding donor 
could be required to provide a signed statement that their payment is 
intended as a “gift”; nevertheless, such statements would not determine 
whether or not a “gift” had occurred.  An analysis would have to be 
based solely on the objective facts of the situation, which will be the 
guiding principle of the following analysis. 
                                                          
 163.  See supra notes 148–56 and accompanying text. 
 164.  Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 286.  
 165.  Mollick, supra note 30, at 3 (stating that in crowdfunding the “actual goals of funders are 
extremely heterogeneous,”  such as “to support a cause . . . , to personally support the project 
founders, as a political statement, as a joke, or for any one of a number of other reasons.” (footnote 
omitted)).   
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2. Tangible Goods or Services 
One of the factors in determining if a transfer is indeed a gift is 
whether or not the party making the gift receives something tangible in 
return.  Depending on the structure of the campaign, a party providing 
crowdfunding money (the funder) may or may not receive tangible goods 
or services from the crowdfunding recipient.  Not receiving tangible 
goods or services in exchange for the funds would strongly indicate a 
gift.
166
  From an objective point of view, the dominant reason the party is 
providing the funds would not be because of a moral duty or a perceived 
economic benefit but rather because of generosity.
167
  It is when a funder 
receives tangible goods or services in exchange for money that the issue 
of whether or not a gift can be claimed arises.  Receiving goods or 
services in exchange for funds, as an isolated factor, is not an objective 
indication that a transaction is a gift.
168
  However, since it is required that 
a gift determination must be made based on the totality of the factors 
involved and because the Duberstein Court also states that the basic or 
dominant reason which explains the transferor’s intent in making the 
transfer must be determined, it is still possible that a gift can occur in a 
crowdfunding context even if the funder received goods or services in 
return for the funds.
169
  For example, an additional factor of significant 
relevance in making an objective determination of a transferor’s intent is 
the fair market value of the goods and services provided from the 
crowdfunding campaign to the funder, particularly in relationship to the 
total amount of funds provided by the funder.  To illustrate, the 605 
funders who each provided $35 to the Guy-Blaché film in exchange for a 
digital download of the film would most likely not be able to prove that 
the exchange was a gift because objectively it could be concluded that a 
pre-purchase of the film was the basic or dominant reason for giving $35.  
The logic behind the latter is that the fair market value of a digital copy 
of a feature-length documentary is between $10 and $50.  On the other 
hand, if a funder provided $10,000 in exchange for the digital copy of the 
documentary then it would be clear that the dominant reason for the 
transaction was generosity and not obligation or a perceived benefit, thus 
the transaction could be a gift.  In spite of the exchange of a good for 
cash, the gift determination would be predicated on the disproportionate 
                                                          
 166.  This type of crowdfunding is the donor model. 
 167.  See supra notes 151–62 and accompanying text. 
 168.  Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285–88; see Note, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 
73 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 844–45 (1973). 
 169.  See infra notes 192–201 and accompanying text. 
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ratio between the $10,000 funding and the $10 to $50 estimated value of 
the digital copy.  These, of course, are extremely clear-cut examples, 
whereas in reality the facts are much less cut and dry.  Exactly how the 
fair market value of the items provided from the crowdfunding campaign 
to the funders should impact the gift determination in crowdfunding will 
be addressed below in Part VI. 
3. Impact of Individual vs. Business Status on Gift Determination 
Based on the plain language of Duberstein, it could be argued that 
whether the party accepting the funds is an individual or a business 
should not be determinative of whether the funds received are a gift.  
That is, the circumstances surrounding the transferee’s acceptance of the 
funds should not be determinative of whether there is a gift transfer 
because the language of Duberstein focuses on the transferor’s intent.
170
  
However, the clear language of Duberstein also states that the gift 
determination is based on “consideration of all the factors” and “the 
totality of the facts of each case.”
171
  Whether the transferee is an 
individual or business is definitely a circumstance involved in the 
transfer that should make it a relevant fact.  Rulings by the courts
172
 and 
examination of the issue by tax scholars
173
 further support the conclusion 
that the circumstances surrounding the actions of the transferee do 
influence the determination of a gift and must be considered.
174
  There 
                                                          
 170.  Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285–86. 
 171.  Id. at 288–89.  
 172.  See infra Part V.B.3.a. 
 173.  See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 77, at 481–82 (“The Ninth Circuit is not alone in believing 
that Duberstein established the transferor’s intent as the exclusive test for gift treatment.  But the 
Supreme Court’s decision was made in a factual context in which no competing principles were 
invoked that might have led the Court to modify that test.  In a subsequent case presenting facts that 
do invoke a competing principle, a court could decide whether that competing principle carries 
sufficient weight to justify a modification of the Duberstein rule.  The better approach would be to 
recognize that there are circumstances where the role or actions of the transferee will prevent a 
transfer from qualifying as a gift, even though the transferor holds the requisite intention for a gift.  
This approach recognizes that the decision to exclude gifts rests on a balancing of competing 
principles, and the actions of a transferee in certain circumstances will enhance the weight to be 
accorded to what otherwise would be the subordinated principle.” (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added)). 
 174.  Professor Douglas A. Kahn and Professor Jeffrey H. Kahn examine these issues and 
conclude that “the Duberstein rule should be revisited by the Supreme Court and modified to 
recognize that there are circumstances where it is proper for the action of the transferee to control the 
characterization of the transaction.” Id. at 483 (emphasis added).  I agree with their conclusions, but 
I take the position that the Duberstein rule may only need to be clarified because the Court ruling 
expressly requires all facts and factors be considered in determining a gift.  Subsequent rulings have 
also interpreted the Duberstein rules in this manner when weighing the transferee’s actions.   
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are no reported cases or guidance from the IRS regarding the 
determination of income as opposed to a gift in the crowdfunding 
context, but the following provides a synopsis of cases and IRS guidance 
provided in non-crowdfunding circumstances, the basic principles of 
which may be applicable to crowdfunding. 
a.  Individuals Receiving Funds 
Olk v. United States
175
 is an example where the court considered the 
circumstances of the transferee in its evaluation of a gift transaction 
regardless of the intent of the transferor.
176
  Dealers working at casinos 
sometimes received “tokes” (betting chips representing money) from 
customers.
177
  The court noted that the dealers did not perform specific 
services in exchange for the tokes, other than doing their jobs for their 
employers, and the dealers combined the tokes and split them evenly at 
the end of the night.
178
  The court noted that the patrons were under no 
obligation to provide the tokes, and approximately 90–95% of the 
patrons gave nothing to the dealers.
179
  The court also noted that 
customers gave the tokes to the dealers “as a result of impulsive 
generosity or superstition.”
180
  Professor Douglas A. Kahn and Professor 
Jeffrey H. Kahn highlight the language in Olk to support their conclusion 
that the court strongly considered the nature of the circumstances 
regarding the transferees in finding that the tokes were taxable income in 
reversal of the district court’s gift determination.
181
  They quote the 
following from Olk: 
Moreover, in applying the statute to the findings of fact, we are not 
permitted to ignore those findings which strongly suggest that tokes in 
the hands of the ultimate recipients are viewed as a receipt 
indistinguishable, except for erroneously anticipated tax differences, 
from wages.  The regularity of the flow, the equal division of the 
                                                          
 175.  536 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 176.  Id. at 877–79.  The trial court ruled that “[t]he tokes are given to dealers as a result of 
impulsive generosity or superstition on the part of players, and not as a form of compensation for 
services.” Id. at 877.  The appellate court accepted the latter as the dominant reason the transferors 
provided the tokes, but the appellate court then stated that “in applying the statute to the findings of 
fact, we are not permitted to ignore those findings which strongly suggest that tokes in the hands of 
the ultimate recipients are viewed as a receipt indistinguishable, except for erroneously anticipated 
tax differences, from wages.” Id. at 879. 
 177.  Id. at 877. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Kahn & Kahn, supra note 77, at 481. 
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receipts, and the daily amount received indicated that a dealer acting 
reasonably would come to regard such receipts as a form of 
compensation for his services.  The manner in which a dealer may 
regard tokes is, of course, not the touchstone for determining whether 
the receipt is excludable from gross income.  It is, however, a 




Professors Kahn and Kahn also provide further examples that 
support the conclusion that the circumstances surrounding an 
individual’s acceptance of money can be facts supporting a 
determination that funds received are taxable income even when the 
transferor has the clear intent to make a gift.
183
  The first example they 
give is as follows: 
X fraudulently disguises himself to appear seriously handicapped and 
impoverished.  Using that disguise, and sitting on a busy corner of a 
large city, X induces passersby to “give” him money, the total of which 
comes to a large sum. The people who gave X the money did so out of 
sympathy for his plight and out of detached and disinterested 
generosity.  Nevertheless, the donations made to X are income to him.  
He obtained the donative intent of the transferors through fraudulent 
action, and he should not be allowed to obtain a tax benefit thereby.
184
 
Another example given is a professional beggar who makes no false 
representations and obtains a substantial amount of donations on the 
street from people who have the required donative intent.
185
  They 
explain that the situation is similar to an adult child receiving a monthly 
allowance from his or her parents, which generally does not result in 
taxable income.
186
  Noting that the professional beggar’s receipts could 
reasonably be determined to be either income or a gift, their conclusion 
is that these funds are income.
187
  They reason that the “balancing of the 
two competing principles (the principle of maximizing the choice of 
consumption for the donor and the principle of accurately measuring 
each individual’s ability to pay)” supports their conclusion since the 
accurate measurement of income is given greater significance based on 
the facts in their example.
188
  It is reasonable to conclude from the 
                                                          
 182.  Id. (quoting Olk, 536 F.2d at 879). 
 183.  Id. at 482. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id.  That the transferee and transferor are family members when an adult child receives 
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Professors’ professional beggar example that the frequency and 
regularity of the receipt of money in the manner described is a factor that 
will generally indicate income rather than a gift when applied to other 
transferor-transferee situations.  Of course, additional factors could come 
into play, like the relationship of the givers to the receivers.  For 
example, family members often have a relationship with the receiver of 
funds that supports a finding of intent based upon affection.  Whereas 
receiving funds from strangers in crowdfunding most likely would not 
support a finding that the giving is based on affection.  However, it 
should be noted that receipts from strangers can be based on “respect, 
admiration, charity, or like impulses.”
189
  That is, the isolated fact that 






 provides an example of facts that are 
somewhat similar to those involved in crowdfunding.  Mr. Kralstein was 
a vice president of the Bakery and Confectionery Workers’ International 
Union of America.
192
  The unions sponsored a testimonial dinner for him 
and they actively solicited donations for the cost of the dinner and the 
cost of creating and distributing a souvenir journal.
193
  Any funds 
remaining after paying the costs were to be given to Mr. Kralstein for 
personal items and to purchase a home.
194
  Mr. Kralstein did not plan or 
arrange the solicitations, journal, or dinner.
195
  Further facts include: (1) 
each dinner was $25 a head; (2) the cost of placing an ad and greetings 
for Mr. Kralstein in the journal was between $50 and $750 for each ad; 
(3) a total of $85,470 was raised, consisting of $33,825 for the dinner and 
$51,645 for the journal; (4) approximately 750 people involved in the 
baking industry were solicited, approximately 400 provided funds for the 
journal, and between 1,300 and 1,400 people attended the dinner; (5) the 
cost of having the dinner was approximately $18,000, the cost of printing 
the journal was approximately $6,250, and Mr. and Mrs. Kralstein 
                                                          
regular funds from his or her parents is a fact that also supports the gift determination; a fact that is 
altered when an individual solicits funds from the general public with whom the transferee does not 
have such a family relationship. See id. 
 189.  Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 
U.S. 711, 714 (1952)). 
 190.  See Dietz, supra note 10, at 303 (“While gifts often occur between friends and family, 
exchanges between business partners, an employer and employee, and even complete strangers can 
be considered gifts as well.”). 
 191.  38 T.C. 810 (1962). 
 192.  Id. at 811. 
 193.  Id. at 812. 
 194.  Id. at 812, 814–15. 
 195.  Id. at 812. 
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Several conclusions drawn by the court are instructive for evaluating 
the tax consequences involved in crowdfunding.  The court reviewed the 
standards provided in Duberstein and determined that $12,000 of the 
$61,000 that Mr. and Mrs. Kralstein received was a nontaxable gift.
197
  
This is an important determination for crowdfunding because the court 
noted that the people who provided funds received a dinner in exchange 
for the funds,
198
 and, although it was not specifically stated, it is a 
reasonable presumption that those parties that provided money for the 
journal also received a copy of the journal.  Therefore, Kralstein is an 
example of a donor providing funds, receiving tangible goods in return, 
and the transaction being considered a gift based on the “totality of 
factors” standard required by Duberstein. 
Another important determination from the court came when it 
rejected the claim that the union was the actual donor of the funds.  The 
court stated that it was “plain that not merely one purported gift is here in 
question, but literally hundreds of purported gifts” made by “persons 
with varying interests.”
199
  By analogy, crowdfunding amounts are not 
received from any intermediary such as Kickstarter but are traced to each 
individual donor.  Further, although the court found that the greater part 
of the funds provided were not gifts because those parties provided them 
with the belief that they would obtain some business benefit, the court 
took into account all of the factors in its decision because Duberstein 
requires the gift determination to be “reached on consideration of all the 
factors.”
200
  The determination of gift or income in crowdfunding also 
requires consideration of all of the facts.  Among those relevant factors 
in Kralstein were that these parties made their contribution by business 
check, took a business deduction for the contributions, and that testimony 




b. Collecting Funds in the Course of a Business 
Another factor influencing a gift determination in a crowdfunding 
                                                          
 196.  Id. at 812–15. 
 197.  Id. at 817. 
 198.  Id. at 816 n.4. 
 199.  Id. at 816–17. 
 200.  Id. at 818–19 (quoting Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 288 (1960)). 
 201.  Id. at 818. 
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campaign is whether or not the transferee soliciting and accepting the 
funds is a business.  Case law and guidance from the IRS shed light on 
the issues regarding on-going trades and businesses that have solicited 
and collected funds from the general public, and it is a factor that affects 
the gift determination in the crowdfunding context. 
In Publishers New Press, Inc. v. Commissioner,
202
 the Tax Court 
ruled that funds solicited from customers were provided in consideration 
of the “normal business function” of Publishers New Press’s business of 
publishing a newspaper, and the receipt of such funds was therefore 
income and not a gift.
203
  Publishers New Press was a New York 
corporation that published a daily and weekly newspaper.
204
  Over three 
years the company made public appeals through its publications 
cautioning readers that if contributions were not immediately forwarded 
to the company it would go out of business.
205
  The court noted that the 
publisher was a corporation organized and operating in pursuit of profit 
and that the only way the company could continue to provide its service 
was by asking for amounts more than it charged for sales of its 
newspapers.
206
  Further, if the company dissolved at any time then its 
assets above its debts could be distributed to its shareholders.
207
  The 
court’s examination of the contributors’ intent in these circumstances 
resulted in its conclusion that the primary intent of the contributors was 
to obtain something that they desired, that is, they sent the funds in order 
to continue to receive the service of the publication of the newspaper 
which the court stated were payments “made in consideration of the 
performance of the petitioner’s normal business function of publishing a 
newspaper,” which is income and not a gift.
208
 
                                                          
 202.  42 T.C. 396 (1964).   
 203.  Id. at 401. 
 204.  Id. at 397. 
 205.  Id.  The company received approximately $28,800 in the first year, $158,870 in the second 
year, and $153,789 in the third year. Id. 
 206.  Id. at 398–400.  The court cited Teleservice Co. of Wyoming Valley v. Commissioner, 27 
T.C. 722, aff’d, 254 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1958), as “somewhat analogous” to the Publishers New Press, 
Inc. case. Id. at 400.  Although Teleservice was decided before Duberstein, the facts were similar to 
Publishers New Press because prospective customers were solicited by Teleservice Company to 
finance a community television system. Id.  The court found that such payments were income 
because “the only way that the (corporation) could be induced to give service was by receipt of 
something in addition to the monthly charge, namely, contributions to enable it to construct 
extensions of the antenna system.” Id. (quoting Teleservice Co., 27 T.C. at 730). 
 207.  Id. at 398–99. 
 208.  Id. at 401.  The court also cited Webber v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 742 (1954), aff’d, 219 
F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1955), as a similar situation to Publishers New Press, Inc. Id. at 400–01.  In that 
case, which was decided before Duberstein, a minister conducted a radio show for profit and 
solicited contributions from listeners. Id. at 400.  The court found that, because the minister made a 
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In Revenue Ruling 73-356
209
 and in General Counsel Memorandum 
36,796
210
 the IRS has further addressed solicitations of contributions in 
the conduct of a trade or business.  In Revenue Ruling 73-356, the IRS 
addressed the situation where a congressman offers a newsletter to 
constituents at a reasonable subscription price, supplementing any 
deficiency in amounts received out of his own funds.
211
  The IRS found 
the subscription fees to be income to the congressman and not a gift 
because the funds were provided as a direct payment for the 
newsletters.
212
  A second congressman sends reports to his constituents 
twelve to fifteen times a year; he also solicits contributions from them to 
defray the costs but sends the newsletter to all constituents whether or 
not they provide a contribution.
213
  The IRS also found these solicited 
amounts to be income and not gifts, arguing that 
[t]he performance of the official duties of a Congressman in his trade or 
business as an elected official includes keeping his constituents 
informed . . . .  Thus, any amount received by a Congressman for the 
purpose of defraying part of the cost of reporting to constituents . . . is a 
substantial benefit to him in that it offsets a portion of the cost to him 
of performing the duties of his office.
214
 
The IRS clearly, and correctly, determined that the first congressman 
engaged in a sales transaction—that is, payment for a service.  Citing 
Publishers New Press, the IRS determined that the second congressman 
was in a similar position as the taxpayer in that case.
215
  The IRS focused 
on the congressman, determining that although the contributions were 
not payments for the publications, he still received a substantial benefit 
from his constituents for apparently doing his job—keeping constituents 
informed.
216
  However, not addressed by the IRS is the fact that—unlike 
customers who are listening to a radio program that they do not want to 
stop or receiving a newspaper that they enjoy reading and do not want it 
to go out of business—constituents are not required to provide funds to 
                                                          
living from the solicited funds and the people sending the money enjoyed the services of the minister 
and wanted the services to continue, their contributions were compensation for services—that is, 
income and not gifts. Id. at 401.  
 209.  Rev. Rul. 73-356, 1973-2 C.B. 31. 
 210.  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,796 (July 26, 1976). 
 211.  Rev. Rul. 73-356, 1973-2 C.B. 31. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id.  
 216.  Id. 
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continue to receive information from their representatives.  As the IRS 
stated, keeping constituents informed is a duty of being a representative.  
Therefore, the IRS’s reliance on Publishers New Press. is misplaced 
because the “primary intent” of transferors/customers who are receiving 
goods and services that will discontinue without further payments is 
distinctly different from the intent of transferors who either do not have a 
vendor/customer relationship with the transferee or who are not 
motivated by the potential discontinuance of a good or service that they 
wish to continue receiving. 
Further, although the IRS cited Duberstein in its ruling, its reasoning 
supporting its conclusion that the second congressman did not receive 
gifts does not indicate that it weighed “the totality of factors” that is 
required to find the “primary intent” of the transferor when evaluating 
whether a transaction is a gift.
217
  In fact, in its determination that there 
was no gift, the IRS seemed to rely on a conclusion that the congressman 
received a substantial benefit when he received amounts that assisted him 
in the duties that are within his job description, without discussing the 
primary intent of the transferors or the totality of factors.
218
  The IRS’s 
omission of an analysis of these factors undercuts its conclusion that 
such funds are income. 
Although it is true that general counsel memoranda are not to be 
relied upon or otherwise cited as precedent by taxpayers,
219
 they do 
provide an understanding of the reasoning underlying the IRS’s approach 
to an issue.  General Counsel Memoranda 36,796 (GCM 36,796), issued 
three years after Revenue Ruling 73-356, brings out two additional 
points.  First, determining whether a transaction is a gift requires 
personal judgments upon which reasonable individuals can disagree; and 
second, whether a gift occurs can change based on the facts of each and 
every transaction.
220
  So, a proper determination requires the IRS to 
expend resources and time to review all facts in every transaction in 
order to determine whether the transaction is included as income or is 
excluded as a gift.  In GCM 36,796, the IRS again reviewed the tax 
consequences of funds received by a congressman to pay for publication 
and dissemination of voter information—facts similar to those in 
Revenue Ruling 73-396.  However, GCM 36,796 contains some facts 
that are different from the facts of Revenue Ruling 73-396, including the 
                                                          
 217.  Id.; Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285–88 (1960). 
 218.  Rev. Rul. 73-356, 1973-2 C.B. 31. 
 219.  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,796 (July 26, 1976).  
 220.  Id. 
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following: (1) an oral trust was created to obtain memberships from the 
general public in exchange for $100 per year; (2) anyone could 
contribute regardless of residence or political affiliation; and (3) the 
congressman did not control the funds, had no authority to pay any bills, 
and could not compel the trust to make payments on his behalf.
221
  The 
IRS did not find that the differences in facts changed the conclusion it 
reached in Revenue Ruling 73-356—that is, the IRS determined that the 
funds received were income and not a gift.
222
  It is interesting to note that 
the IRS in GCM 36,796 stated that, based on Duberstein and Publishers 
New Press, it held in Revenue Ruling 73-396 that “since the 
contributions were made to assure the continued publication of the 
materials, the amounts received were not gifts.”
223
  Therefore, it is clear 
that according to the IRS and the courts, payments made by a payor to a 
business in order to assure the continuation of a service from that 
business are income to the business and not a gift.  One could make the 
case, however, that a one-time payment, unrelated to the continuation of 
a good or service from the recipient, is distinguishable from the 
payments at issue in Revenue Ruling 73-396 and GCM 36,796.  
Therefore, such a payment, without regard to the other factors present in 
the transaction, would not necessarily be considered income because the 
primary intent of the transferor is not the continuation of a good or 
service. 
4. How Existing Gift Laws Apply to Crowdfunding Model 1 
(Donations) and Models 2 and 3 (Reward and Pre-Purchase) 
Although the gift determination is based on the facts and 
circumstances of each situation,
224
 one may draw broad conclusions from 
the law, as well as guidance from the patterns of thinking presented 
above.
225
  First, it is clear that since there is not just one but multiple gifts 
from an intermediary (for example Kickstarter) to the crowdfundee used 
in a crowdfunding campaign, it is necessary to examine the facts and 
circumstances of each individual transaction between the crowdfundee 
and each funder in order to make an income or gift determination.
226
 
To put the implications of these facts into some perspective, just one 
                                                          
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 224.  See supra Part V.A. 
 225.  See supra Parts V.A., V.B.1–3.   
 226.  See Kralstein v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 810, 816 n.3 (1962). 
2015] TAXATION OF CROWDFUNDING 181 
crowdfunding intermediary, Kickstarter, reported that between 2009 and 
2015, 9 million backers made more than 24 million total pledges, 
receiving a plethora of goods and services in the process.
227
  First, these 
statistics mean that taxpayers and the IRS will be required to expend the 
time and resources necessary to examine each factor in every transaction 
to try to comply.
228
  Second, if the provider of the funds receives no 
tangible good or service in return for the funds, it would be a strong 
indicator that the transferor’s intent supports a classification of the 
transaction as a gift.
229
  Third, even if a funder does receive tangible 
goods or services in return, it may still be possible for such transactions 
to be a gift—at least to the extent that the fair market value of the goods 
and services received is less than the funds provided by the transferor.
230
  
In fact, the more the amount provided by the transferor is greater than the 
fair market value of the goods and services received, the greater the 
possibility that the transaction can be classified as a gift.
231
 
Fourth, certain facts about the transferee in a transaction can 
significantly alter a gift determination,
232
 for example, whether the 
transferee is an individual or a business.
233
  If the transferee is an 
individual the following factors are important: (1) whether or not the 
recipient is an employee receiving the funds at work; (2) the frequency 
and regularity of the receipt of funds; and (3) the relationship of the 
transferee to the transferor.
234
  An income determination is more strongly 
indicated if an individual receives funds as an employee, receives them 
frequently and regularly, and is a stranger to the transferor (since family 
relationships are more indicative of  a gift).
235
  It should be noted that if 
the recipient is a business, funds that are provided by a customer who 
                                                          
 227.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 228.  See supra Part V.A. 
 229.  But see supra Part V.B.3.a–b where other factors besides the “intent of the transferor” have 
been sufficient to find a determination of income and not a gift. 
 230.  Kralstein, 38 T.C. at 818. 
 231.  The Supreme Court has stated 
[I]f the payment proceeds primarily from . . . “the incentive of anticipated benefit” of an 
economic nature, it is not a gift. . . . A gift in the statutory sense, on the other hand, 
proceeds from a “detached and disinterested generosity,” “out of affection, respect, 
admiration, charity or like impulses.” 
Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (citations omitted). 
 232.  See, e.g., Publishers New Press, Inc. v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 396, 400 (1964) (finding that 
funds received to keep publication from failing were not gifts); Olk v. United States, 536 F.2d 876, 
879 (9th Cir. 1976) (looking to transferee’s perspective when making a gift determination); supra 
note 182 and accompanying text. 
 233.  See supra Part V.A.3. 
 234.  See supra Part V.A.3.a. 
 235.  Id. 
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desires the continuation of the business’s normal primary function are 




5. Why Government Action Is Required to Clarify the Application of 
the Gift Income Tax Exclusion to Crowdfunding 
As a revolutionary funding mechanism made possible by new 
technology, crowdfunding has created challenges to the current laws that 
define a gift for income tax purposes and will require clarification of the 
current tax laws.
237
  Since the determination of a gift is based on all of 
the facts and is to be examined on a case-by-case basis,
238
 the first 
challenge is to address that aspect of the law which requires taxpayers 
engaging in a successful crowdfunding campaign to review all of the 
facts of every transfer of funds in the campaign and make a gift 
determination accordingly.  The second challenge stems from the fact 
that the IRS is required to either accept the taxpayer’s determination 
without its own review, or review for itself (and at its expense) the facts 
underlying every gift determination by the taxpayer—fact by fact for 
each and every transfer.
239
  For example, the successful Kickstarter 
campaign for the Guy-Blaché film had 3,840 backers that provided 
approximately $219,000.
240
  The taxpayer receiving those funds would 
have $219,000 in taxable income 
241
 unless the funds can be designated 
as a gift; however, in order to exclude the amounts received as a “gift” 
all of the factors in each and every one of the 3,840 transactions would 
have to be evaluated to determine which of the transactions indeed 
                                                          
 236.  Publishers New Press, Inc., 42 T.C. at 401. 
 237.  See Wendy Gerzog Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification of 
Historical Inequities, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 429 (1985) (“Much of the blame for the inequity 
and theoretical innovation [regarding fringe benefits] belongs to the Service.  Historically, it has 
provided little consistency in its approach to in-kind compensation.”); see also Kelcy S. Mullins, 
Fringe Benefits: IRS Issues Final Regulations, 68 TAXES 259, 259 (1990), 
http://www.floridaprobatecounsel.com/wp-content/uploads/docs/Corporate/Fringe-Benefits-Irs-
Issues-Final-Regulations.pdf (“The tax treatment of fringe benefits is an issue that directly affects 
most employers and employees.  Traditionally, employers have provided employees with tax-free 
fringe benefits in addition to their taxable wages.  Unfortunately, there was considerable uncertainty 
regarding the taxation of employee fringe benefits.  Except for a few statutory provisions, the 
determination of whether noncash benefits created taxable income was left to the courts to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis.  Their interpretations of the scope of the general inclusion rule of 
Internal Revenue Code Section 61 varied.”). 
 238.  Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 288 (1960). 
 239.  See id. at 287–88; see also Kralstein v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 810, 819 (1962). 
 240.  Green & van Sluijs, supra note 24. 
 241.  See supra Part IV. 
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qualify as an excludable gift.
242
  How many transactions have occurred in 
all crowdfunding campaigns in the United States is unknown.  Also 
unknown is how many of those transactions would be eligible for 
exclusion as a gift under Code section 102.  To gain an inkling of the 
magnitude of the challenge, Kickstarter reported that 9,313,328 total 
funders have made 24,812,229 pledges for a total of $1,906,431,990 
provided to crowdfunding campaigns since Kickstarter began in 2009.
243
 
The burden of proving a gift is on the taxpayer claiming the income 
tax exclusion, as is the cost in money and time expended.
244
  However, it 
must be kept in mind that the basis of sound tax policy is the proper 
balance of “equity, efficiency, and administrability,”
245
 and as Professor 
Abreu and Professor Greenstein adroitly point out:  
 
[H]aving an administrable tax law is what makes it possible for the 
system to raise the revenue which is its raison d’etre.  An 
unadministrable system will almost certainly be inequitable and 
inefficient because it will affect taxpayers arbitrarily, resulting in 
inequity and inefficiency.  Simplicity enhances administrability and 
administrability is necessary so that the system can raise revenue in an 
equitable and efficient way.
246
 
Further, this challenge doesn’t solely affect taxpayers.  As noted 
above, this challenge affects the IRS as well as taxpayers.  The IRS will 
be required to either accept taxpayers’ gift determinations or expend its 
limited resources reviewing a huge number of items in a large number of 
returns that are claiming a gift exclusion for receipts derived from 
crowdfunding campaigns so that it can determine which returns to 
audit.
247
  Given the limited resources of the IRS, this would represent a 
daunting challenge.  On top of this, court challenges by taxpayers to IRS 
determinations would further deplete the limited government resources, 
and, perhaps more importantly, raise the possibility of conflicting rulings 
by courts.
248
  In fact, the Duberstein Court addressed the possibility that 
its decision requiring that all facts be examined on a case-by-case basis 
could create uncertainty or become unadministrable when it stated: “If 
                                                          
 242.  See supra Part V.B.4. 
 243.  See supra notes 6–7.   
 244.  See sources cited supra note 136. 
 245.  Defining Income, supra note 84, at 305; see also Lederman, supra note 96, at 1658. 
 246.  Defining Income, supra note 84, at 335. 
 247.  See Alm & Soled, supra note 14, at 445 (“[W]ith its limited budget, the IRS must choose 
whom to audit, based at least in part on predicted revenue yields.”). 
 248.  See supra note 238. 
184 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
there is fear of undue uncertainty . . . Congress may make more precise 
its treatment of the matter by singling out certain factors and making 
them determinative of the matters, as it has done in one field of the ‘gift’ 
exclusion’s former application, that of prizes and awards.”
249
  Clearly, 
the gift determination in crowdfunding campaigns is just such a situation 
wherein taxpayers and the IRS are required to make factual 
determinations regarding millions of transactions,
250
 many of which fall 
into areas that do not lend themselves to obvious and clear resolutions.
251
 
VI. WHAT CAN BE RECOMMENDED TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGES? 
It is recommended that the IRS issue guidance stating clearly that 
funds acquired in crowdfunding campaigns are taxable gross income 
required to be reported as such on appropriate tax forms.  It is further 
recommended that the IRS provide a safe harbor allowing taxpayers who 
complete crowdfunding campaign Models 1, 2, and 3 (Donation, 
Reward, and Pre-Purchase) to claim a gift for transactions that contain 
certain facts.  The following is a list of the facts that would affect a gift 
determination: (1) the contributor to the crowdfunding campaign receives 
nothing in return for the funds contributed, or the amount contributed to 
the campaign is at least ten times greater than the fair market value of all 
goods and/or services received from the recipient of the funds; (2) the 
funds are received by an individual and not a business; (3) the funds are 
not provided by a current or future customer; (4) the funds are given by a 
relative, acquaintance, or friend; (5) the crowdfundee receives funds 
from two or less crowdfunding campaigns in a calendar year; (6) the 
crowdfundee is contractually required to spend all funds on a specific 
endeavor and receives no income from the funds; and (7) the 
crowdfundee is not receiving funds in the capacity of employee. 
The IRS should advise taxpayers that there is a rebuttable 
presumption that the transaction is a gift if it has the first two factors 
(numbers 1 and 2) in addition to three of the five remaining factors 
(numbers 3 through 7).  The IRS should also require taxpayers to file a 
statement with the tax return claiming exclusion of crowdfunding 
receipts from income because such funds are a gift.  Such a statement 
should require taxpayers to identify which factors support the conclusion 
                                                          
 249.  Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960). 
 250.  See supra text accompanying note 244. 
 251.  See supra Part V.B.1–4.  See also Alm & Soled, supra note 14, at 442 (discussing tax 
treatment of automobile expenses and stating: “Aside from such deliberate violations, the lack of 
clear rules is another contributory factor in taxpayer noncompliance.”).  
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that the proper determination for each crowdfunding transaction should 
be a gift. 
A rebuttable presumption will act as a “carrot” to motivate taxpayers 
to review the facts of each transaction in deciding if a gift determination 
is appropriate.  The rebuttable presumption standard would not preclude 
the IRS from examining all of the facts of any specific transaction and 
making its own gift determination, but it would serve to reduce 
expenditure of IRS resources that would be required to review every 
transaction.  These recommendations would go a long way in achieving a 
better balance between equity, efficiency, and administrability in the 
taxing of crowdfunding. 
 
